We consider the e¢ cient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payo¤ types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the e¢ cient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a …nite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of su¢ cient conditions for e¢ cient partial implementation in this classical auction setting.
Introduction
Before the work of Harsanyi (1967/68 ) economists used to routinely argue that game theory could not be applied to economic settings because it required common knowledge of the environment. Following Harsanyi (1967/68) , economists accepted that rich enough "type spaces"allowed any possible lack of common knowledge to be incorporated. But very rich type spaces would be needed and applied work remains highly sensitive to sometimes unexamined modelling choices about types. Nowhere is this more true than in mechanism design. Two of us have written a series of papers highlighting the importance of lack of common knowledge and rich type spaces in mechanism design, now to be collected together in a book (Bergemann and Morris (2012) ). Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed that types that cannot be distinguished in this language may always pool in some equilibrium and thus the e¢ cient allocation can only be fully implemented if it is measurable with respect to statements that can be expressed in this language.
Partial Implementation
There are I agents. Each agent i has a "payo¤ type" i belonging to a …nite set i . Each agent i's monetary valuation of a good depends on the pro…le of payo¤ types = ( 1 ; : : : ; I ) and is given by a valuation function v i : 1 I ! R + . Agents are assumed to know their own payo¤ type i but we want to allow for rich beliefs and higher order beliefs. Thus we assume each agent has a "type" t i belonging to a …nite set T i , and write b i : T i ! i for a function describing an agent's payo¤ type and b i : T i ! (T i ) for his belief type. This decomposition of an agent's type into a payo¤ type and a belief type is a natural one in this quasi-linear setting. Two of us used this implicit description of interdependent types in our work on robust mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris (2012) ). We will discuss brie ‡y below a sense in which this decomposition can be seen as without loss of generality.
We will focus on the problem of allocating the object to the agent with the highest valuation. Write i ( ) for the agent who values the object the most, i.e., i ( ) 2 arg max i v i ( ), and in this …nite type setting, we can assume without loss of generality that i ( ) is uniquely de…ned. We are interested in designing a …nite mechanism involving monetary transfers which has an equilibrium where the object is always allocated to the agent who values it the most.
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. In this context, a direct mechanism consists of a rule specifying monetary transfers to all agents, y : T ! R I .
Now if agents report themselves to be of the type pro…le t = (t 1 ; : : : ; t I ), the object will be allocated to agent i b (t) , where we write b (t) = b 1 (t 1 ) ; : : : ; b I (t I ) , and each agent i will receive a monetary transfer y i (t). This direct mechanism will be incentive compatible if
where the indicator function I i ( ) of agent i is one if i = i b (t) , and zero otherwise. Thus we say e¢ cient partial implementation is possible if and only if there exists y :
To give a characterization of the incentive compatibility of the e¢ cient social choice function i , or short, the e¢ cient partial implementation, it is useful to …rst identify key properties of players'incentives to report their payo¤ types for beliefs about others'payo¤ types. Fix an agent i and …x his beliefs about the payo¤ types of others, i 2 ( i ). Suppose that agent i expects the object to be allocated according to i based on the truthful reports of other agents and his own (true or false) report. By extension of the valuation function v i , we write
for the expected utility gain of agent i from a misreport 0 i relative to his true 
Now, Theorem 1 in Rochet (1987) shows that there exists
0 i 2 i if and only if V i is cyclically monotonic on
Thus cyclic monotonicity tells us that -ignoring belief types beyond the induced beliefs i over the payo¤ types -it is possible to choose transfers that give an agent an incentive to report his payo¤ type truthfully. To state this precisely, it will be useful to introduce the mapping b i : (T i ) ! ( i ) which describes the beliefs over payo¤ types induced by the agents'belief types, so that b
. Now the incentive compatibility condition (1) can be re-written as:
Now we consider what we can learn about agents'beliefs and how we can use what we learn.
The classical environment we are considering -with quasi-linear utility and no limited liability constraints -is well-known to be very permissive in allowing "belief extraction". As observed by d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979), Myerson (1981) and Cremer and McLean (1985) , it is possible to elicit agents'beliefs over other types by o¤ering them gambles. Our general characterization of e¢ cient partial implementation will essentially state that agents' beliefs can be elicited "for free"and what then matters is whether the set of payo¤ types consistent with a given belief type can be distinguished. But this reduces to a cyclic monotonicity condition. Thus write b i ( i ) for the set of payo¤ types of player i associated with belief type Proof. Suppose e¢ cient partial implementation is possible and so (2) holds for some
.
with su¢ ciently large K.
We note that the present result of partial implementation is stated for the (ex post) e¢ cient allocation rule i ( ). But in fact, the above result is more generally valid for every allocation rule that is measurable with respect to the payo¤ type pro…le . The only modi…cation arises with respect to the utility gains V i ( ) from misreporting the payo¤ type, i to (2000), suppose that a single crossing condition is satis…ed with respect to the (ordered) payo¤ types of the agents, so that each v i is strictly monotonic in i and
for all i; j with i 6 = j. Then V i satis…es cyclic monotonicity on ( i ; i ) for every i (which implies ex post incentive compatibility) and thus again it can be shown that the cyclic monotonicity requirements of the proposition hold. ). Now, in terms of our language, their environment in Section 4 can be described by a type space T i = i , the payo¤ types can be described by the identity mapping b i , and the belief types can be described by
Arguments going back at least to Cremer and McLean (1985) say BDP holds generically on …nite type spaces, since if we …x a …nite set of types and perturb beliefs, then they will all be di¤erent and BDP will hold.
Recent contributions, notably Heifetz and Neeman (2006) and Chen and Xiong (2011) , examine when BDP holds on in…nite type spaces, and in particular if it can be said to hold "generically" on in…nite type spaces. 2 Such su¢ cient conditions do not naturally arise in multidimensional payo¤ type space i , expect for some special cases, as noted by Maskin (1992) 
Interdependent Types and Full Implementation
Importantly, Proposition 1 only establishes partial implementation, i.e. that the e¢ cient allocation arises in some equilibrium but there may exist other equilibria with ine¢ cient allocations. Suppose there are three agents, I = 3, and each agent has two possible types,
1g. Each agent's valuation of the object is given by
Each agent has only two types, and thus a single belief type for each payo¤ type. Suppose, in particular, that if a type has valuation i , he assigns independent probability 1 8 to each of the other agents having valuation j = i , and the remaining probability 7 8 to j = 1 i .
E¢ cient partial implementation is possible in this example (by both a belief extraction argument, i.e., su¢ cient condition 3 above, or an ex post incentive compatibility argument, e.g., su¢ cient condition 4 above). But observe that each type of each agent has an expected value of 7 6 for the object. To see why, note that if agent 1 say has 1 = 1, his expectation of 2 (or 3 ) is 1 8 and thus his expectation of 1 + . But if agent 1 has 1 = 0, his expectation of 2 (or 3 ) is 7 8 and thus his expectation of 1 + .
Thus, there will always be an equilibrium where both types of each player behave the same, which cannot give rise to the e¢ cient allocation, as shown in a general payo¤ environment in
Bergemann and Morris (2009).
Following Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011), we propose a natural description of agents'types in this setting. An agent's (unconditional) willingness to pay for the object does not depend on other agents'types and thus has a natural meaning. If it makes sense to speak of all agents'willingness to pay for the object, it makes sense to talk about an agent's beliefs about other agents'willingness to pay for the object, and his willingness to pay conditional on others'willingness to pay for the object. Call the agent's unconditional willingness to pay his …rst order type. Call his beliefs over others'willingness to pay and conditional willingness to pay his second order type. Now we can inductively de…ne an agent's (n + 1)th order type to be his beliefs over others'nth order types and his willingness to pay conditional on others'nth order types. We can thus identify an agent with a hierarchy of statements about preferences and conditional preferences.
In the simple setting of this note, such hierarchies can be de…ned formally as follows. An nth level type is pair t n = (b n ; v n ) consisting of a belief component and valuation component.
Write T n for the set of nth level types that can arise in a …nite type space. We describe the sets T n inductively. Let T 1 = f?g R + with a typical 1st level type t 1 = (?; v 1 ) consisting of a degenerate belief type and an unconditional valuation of the object. Now an (n + 1)th level type t n+1 = (b n+1 ; v n+1 ) consists of a simple (i.e., …nite support) probability distribution b n+1 2 (T n ) with support supp(b n+1 ) and a valuation function v n+1 : supp(b n+1 ) ! R + . Now a hierarchy of types is a sequence of nth order types (t 1 ; t 2 ; : : : ; t n ; : : :
A sequence of types is coherent if each (n + 1)th type t n+1 induces beliefs over other agents' (n 1)th level types and willingness to pay conditional on other agents'(n 1)th level types that are consistent with those of t n . (We omit the formal statement of this condition). Now if we write T f for the set of all coherent hierarchies of higher order types that can arise in …nite type spaces, we have a natural language in which to discuss agents'types.
In Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011), we discuss the extension to in…nite types and construct a universal space of higher order preferences T from hierarchies. We can identify those hierarchies with beliefs over others'types and valuations conditional on their hierarchies. Thus we identify a type t 2 T with a probability measure over the types of others b 2 (T )
and an equivalence class of b -integrable valuation functions v :
(T ) I 1 ! R (where we identify two functions if they agree b -almost surely). In this sense,
we have a canonical way of representing type spaces with a decomposition of types into "payo¤ types" and "belief types," as we did earlier. However, it is important to realize that these payo¤ types does not specify valuations on 0-probability events.
This language is closely related to full implementation. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed that a necessary condition for Bayesian full implementation of a social choice function using a …nite mechanism on a …nite type space was that two types which had the same hierarchies of preferences received the same allocation. While they expressed this "measurability" condition as a property of the …xed …nite type space, it can be expressed without reference to a particular …nite type space as we described above. Thus, if full implementation is required, we can at most achieve constrained e¢ ciency, with the object allocated to the agent Exact full implementation is generally not possible in the allocation of a single good: even with private values, while bidding one's true value is a dominant strategy, it is often only a weak best response and it is easy to construct ine¢ cient equilibria in dominated strategies.
For su¢ cient conditions for full implementation with …nite mechanisms, the objective must be weakened to virtual implementation, so that i (t 1 ; : : : ; t I ) is allocated the object with arbitrarily high probability. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed that virtual Bayesian full implementation is possible under Bayesian incentive compatibility and their measurability condition. In this context, this implies that constrained e¢ cient allocation of the good is possible if the condition of Proposition 1 holds on the coarsened type space that is expressible in our language. 
